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Paul Verhoeven's 1987 film Robocop[1] can be seen as an exploration into the realm of subjectivity and an inquisition into the fixity and invulnerability of the human subject. Using analyses from thoerists such as Slavoj Zizek, Steve Best and Dale Bradley, the following entry will attempt to probe the perceivable message in Robocop regarding the existence of a cybernetic subject and the possibilities for such a subject to be devoid of human essence or form. This will be acheived through several character sketches and an examination of the role each character fulfills in the interplay of subjectivies within the film.

Contents 1 Robocop 2 ED 209 3 Bob Morton 4 Lewis 5 References

[edit] Robocop

The character of Robocop, and perhaps by association, the film as a whole, is subject to examination based on two seemingly polarized readings. The first involves a resilient human subject that resist deterioration despite its lack of human embodiment. The film can be seen as being rife with evidence to support such a reading. Slavoj Zizek identifies a process of resubjectification where Robocop gradually returns from existing as a being of pure incarnated drive to one of human desire (Zizek, pg. 22). In other words, Robocop switches from a robot governed by a series of directives to a human spirit contained inside a robot bent on avenging his own previous death.

Steve Best points to a similar occurence as he insists that Robocop's former identity as Murphy re-emerges desipte the computer program meant to 'wipe his memory'. For Best, this return signifies the overcoming of the crisis of subjectivity that Robocop seemingly presents. This 'return of Murphy' can be seen to prove that technology cannot acheive its goal of completely obliterating the human subject (Best, pg. 6).

Dale Bradley (he's our prof!) present an alternative to the more conservative reading as exemplified by Zizek and Best. According to Bradley, the cyborg, in this case, Robocop, is capable of becoming aware of and/or recognizing the identity of the 'human' who was used to provide the raw materials for its creation. Furthermore, he can, in turn, 're-acquire' this past identity through a series of performative acts that are associated with what is perceived to be its past 'self' (Bradley pg. 11; 13)

As Bradley states, neither account is inaccurate or incorrect, but rather both point to the indeterminability of the text and the creation of a space for multiple readings and interpretations (pg. 15).

[edit] ED 209

Enforcement Droid Series 209 (ED 209) is Robocop's juxtapositional robotic counterpart in the film. Despite possessing a more 'human' name (Ed) then Robocop, ED 209 is defined through Robocop's constant ability to elude and defeat him. Its trademark weaknesses are seemingly mundane (for instance, not being able to walk down stairs); but nonetheless, they render him ineffective in combatting the more capable (more human?) Robocop. Where Robocop is programmed with a human voice, ED 209 is made to sound like a growling beast and exhibits actions that unmistakably allude to base animal behaviour.

Best sees ED 209 as a critique of technology and its attempt to exert control over humans (Best, pg. 3). Following this logic, Robocop, in its constant narrative opposition to ED 209, would represent the human side of this dichotomy. However, as Bradley identifies, Robocop is also engaged in fierce battle with humans as well (Boderick and the Detroit police force) and is therefore more likely to inhabit a liminal space between the two subjectivities (Bradley, pg. 17).

[edit] Bob Morton

Morton acts as the continuous repressor of Robocop's supposed 'humanity'. When his team of scientists informs him that they have managed to salvage an arm from Murphy's riddled corpse, Morton orders it to be removed and reitterates his order for 'complete prosthesis'. Similarly, he chastizes Lewis for suggesting that Robocop has a name (and by association, a subjectivity? a human subjectivity?).

However, Morton is killed in a murder perpetrated by Bodicker and Dick Jones, and is eliminated from having any further involvement in the fate of Robocop. It is intriguing to consider the fact that the primary barrier to Robocop 'finding himself' suffers a horrible fate at the hands of the two men who ultimately situate Robocop in the aforementioned liminal space - Bodicker (his primary human enemy) and Dick Jones (the braintrust behind ED 209).

[edit] Lewis

The crucial recognition to make when examining this film, however, is not to simply comprehend what the narrative says about Robocop, but moreso what the film says about us. As Best states, Robocop is a traditional and conservative narrative that is ultimately framed by codes of closure and redemption (Best, pg. 7). The readings proposed by those such as Zizek and Best are windows into what the typical viewer is understood to expect and how a rightful restoration is most effectively achieved in narrative terms.

Lewis is the character who represents this perspective in Robocop. Through her own expectations of Robocop's subjectivity, Lewis triggers the 'curiosity' (or performance of which) in his programming. It is noteworthy to recognize that when she corners Robocop in the hallway, she does not ask 'Murphy, is it you?', but instead states 'Murphy, it's you'. Lewis projects a human subjectivity onto Robocop and in doing so, she is acting on behalf of all of us and situates Robocop in a narrative structure that will provide the closure and redemption the viewer so fervently seeks.

[edit] References

Best, Steve (1987). "Robocop: The crisis of subjectivity". [2].

Bradley, Dale (2006). "The return of the repressed: Cybersubjectivity in ROBOCOP." In Invisible Culture. Vol. 10. [3]

Zizek, Slavoj (1992). "Looking Awry: An introduction to Jacques Lacan through popular culture." Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.