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Contents 1 Introduction: 2 Nobert Wiener: Probability, Analogy and Cybernetics 3 Saussure: Analogy and Difference 4 Music Theory: A 'Langue' You Can Play 5 Conclusion 6 References

[edit] Introduction:

At the height of World War II, Norbert Wiener, with the help of Julian Bigelow, worked with the United States Air Force to develop an automated anti-aircraft gun; a machine that could aid gun operators in predicting the flight paths of enemy aircraft. The device received tracking data in the form of radar signals and would then, through complex statistical analyses, offer predictions as to which direction the plane was most likely to travel. These automated weapons did not base their analyses on the essence or abilities of particular planes or pilots, but operated on equations and algorithms that emphasized pattern rather than specific content. These statistical data were thereby extrapolated to represent real world events vis-à-vis the movement of enemy aircraft (Hayles, pg. 98).

As N. Katherine Hayles writes in her book How We Became Posthuman (1999), the types of analogical processes employed by Wiener and Bigelow were instrumental in the formation of the contemporary discourse of cybernetics. For Hayles, the ability for information, through an analogical process, to cross multiple disciplinary and physiological boundaries is paramount to the construction of a posthuman subject and a disembodied experience (pg. 98).

However, my purpose today is not to illuminate the historical importance of Wiener’s work in information studies or to debate the validity of Hayles’ claim, but rather, I wish to probe in further detail Hayles’ own analogy: that being her comparison of Wiener’s definition of information and Ferdinand de Saussure’s view of language, or la langue, which represents the systematic elements of human language.

To accomplish this, I will first outline Wiener’s probabilistic theory of information and his emphasis on the concepts of pattern and analogy therein. Following which, I will describe the Saussurian distinction of langue and parole and attempt to relate Saussure’s notion of difference to Wiener’s discussions of pattern and value. Finally, I will extend this comparison further to include the realm of music theory and explore the potential inclusion of the concept of parole within cybernetic theory and informatics.

[edit] Nobert Wiener: Probability, Analogy and Cybernetics

The crux of Wiener’s thinking stems from his belief in the constructedness of the boundaries of the human subject (Hayles, pg. 84). If the human, in its embodied form, can be considered as such, and be subject to continuous redefinition and reapplication, then bodies of knowledge are similarly capable of being seen as primarily constructed forms (pg. 85). The constant transformation of not only the body, but also of knowledge, translates into a view of the world fundamentally based in probability, where future events and developments actually defy prediction (pg. 87-88).

A lack of fixity within the realm of physical or epistemological truths necessitates an inclination to view the world as a biological and geological evolution realized from a range of possible outcomes (pg. 89). In other words, the present state of being does not exist as the only possible incarnation of the universe, but rather a single incarnation that has developed in spite of the countless other possibilities that have not. Thus, the crucial cosmological tension exists not between God and science or teleology and causality, but between purpose and randomness. For Wiener, the world as we know it emerges from a series of random events, or as Hayles explains, from “the froth of chaos” (pg. 88).

Wiener considers information theory as an extension of this probabilistic worldview, involving a choice of one message from a cacophony of other messages. Information is communicated not as an essence in itself, but as an inherent relationship of difference between itself and other possible messages (Hayles, pg. 91). Thus, it is imperative to determine elements of pattern within these relationships, rather than assessing content or a specific essence that is trying to be communicated (pg. 98).

Returning to the example of Wiener and Bigelow’s anti-aircraft system, an airplane can move in a number of directions at a given time and this movement cannot be precisely and perfectly predicted. However, it is known that certain manoeuvres are favoured in certain situations and through statistical analysis, a pattern can be determined based on the relation between the favoured manoeuvres versus those which are not favoured. Therefore, this pattern can be extrapolated to determine the pattern a pilot is most likely to take.

This conclusion is obtained via analogy: information is inputted as a radar signal, is then analysed as statistical data, becomes output as the representation of a pattern and is finally related to the movements of actual pilots. This process is possible because of the belief in an underlying analogous relationship between statistically determined patterns and the behaviour of fighter pilots, which ultimately allows for the data to traverse physical boundaries (i.e. from radar signal to statistical data to human behaviour) and be applied in a real life situation.

It must be noted, however, that such an analogy does not exist as a one-to-one relationship; for instance, it would be mistaken to posit that pilots are machines, and thus the analogy holds that pilots are like or behave like machines. Nevertheless, these analogies allow pattern and probability to become manifest in real life situations, especially those situations involving embodiment and the human (or posthuman) condition. As Hayles asserts, cybernetics as a discipline could not exist without the ability to move across these boundaries; cybernetics could not exist without analogy.

[edit] Saussure: Analogy and Difference

Hayles continues, “For Wiener, analogy was communication and communication was analogy” (Hayles, pg. 99). Such a point is furthered by Wiener’s assertion that all language is purely analogical (pg. 98). In the Cours de Linguistiques Générale, Ferdinand de Saussure posits that language operates upon a similar analogy between a concept and a sound-image, or more notably, a signified and a signifier (Saussure, pg. 77-78).

This analogy is not defined by an intrinsic bond between a thing and the term used to represent it and therefore is not an act of nomenclature or simply naming something (Gadet, pg. 31). Rather, a sign exists on the basis of a relationship between the physical form of the sign (the signifier) and the mental representation of a meaning (the signified) (pg. 32).

This is an analogical relationship because, as Hayles explains, it puts forth propositions that must be interpreted based on one’s own experience in order to be properly understood (Hayles, pg. 98). In other words, since the signified exists as a mental representation of something (for example, my idea of what a pen is, rather than the actual pen itself), language requires a collective of shared analogies and categories amongst speakers in order to refer to objects in the real world.

For Saussure, this collective is the presence of langue, “the sum of word-images stored in the minds of all individuals” that acts as “a sort of mental contract signed by the members of a community” (Saussure, pg. 74). Further defined, langue stands for the system of knowledge that speakers of a language share about what is acceptable in that language and is distinct from parole, which is the actual use of language in speech (a concept I will return to later) (Danesi and Perron, pg. 59).

A speech community without langue is comparable to the chaos imagined by Wiener, as Saussure states, “…without langue, thought is a vague, uncharted nebula” (Saussure quoted in Gadet, pg. 31). This nebulous state of being becomes organized through the selection of certain sound-images to communicate certain concepts (i.e. the relation of signifier and signified) and the historical persistence of such a selection. This process supersedes the notion of labelling objects based on any inherent or natural reference (Hayles, pg. 98). Just as information for Wiener is communicated through the realization of one message from a slew of other messages, for Saussure, a sign is communicated solely by its selection from a range of other possible alternatives.

This selection within the system of language is made on the premise of difference. As Saussure states regarding linguistic elements, “Their most precise characteristic is in being what others are not” (Saussure quoted in Gadet, pg. 54). The system of langue operates in relation to itself. Similar to Wiener’s theory of information, alternatives gain meaning through patterns of relation to other possible alternatives.

For example, the concept ‘man’ is distinguishable from the concept ‘men’ in so far as the vowel sound of each sound image is different. The variable forms of the sound-image ‘man’ will be associated with the concept of a single male person until the sound-image coalesces into a recognized form of the sound-image ‘men’; then, such a sound-image would act to represent the concept of two or more male people. The signifiers are allowed to vary, without consequence to the signified, within the limits of difference; once a particular threshold has been reached, the associated concept will be subsequently altered.

[edit] Music Theory: A 'Langue' You Can Play

A similar phenomenon occurs within the realm of music theory. Marks on a musical staff are made to represent corresponding notes; but once again, they do not signify the actual sound of a note, but rather the mental representation that is associated with that note. Based on musical convention, there exists continuity as to the mental representations associated with particular marks, similar to the aforementioned “mental contract” existing amongst speakers of a particular language as defined by Saussure.

In sum, marks on a musical staff act as signifiers for the form of a signified as the mental representations associated with musical notes. These signs exist within a conventional system that also operates on the basis of difference; for example, similar marks on a page possess different signifieds based on their location on the musical staff. Once a mark passes a certain threshold on the staff, the associated concept of a note becomes altered.

[edit] Conclusion

This example allows us to return to the original notion of boundaries. For Wiener’s anti-aircraft gun, it was an analogy of ‘statistical patterns are like fighter pilots’ that allowed the information to cross a physical boundary and be applied on the WWII battlefield. Similar analogies apply in the realms of language and music. For language, the existence of a similar signified accompanying a signifier between two members of a speech community allows an utterance to be understood once it is spoken.

The analogy ‘my langue is like your langue’ allows mental representations to be successfully communicated via speech. In music, the analogy that ‘notes on a page are like audible tones of sound’ allows musical “information” to be performed by separate members of the music community simply by reading the score.

The commonality among these three analogies is that it often requires some sort of execution for information to traverse the physiological boundaries of embodiment. No planes can actually be shot down unless the information obtained from the statistical patterns translates into actual warheads being fired at enemy fighters. Similarly, a signified cannot be exchanged unless it is uttered as part of a speech act, just as a musical note cannot be heard unless it is played on a musical instrument.

Thus, to transcend boundaries of the body, the information itself must become embodied. In other words, it appears as though one must go beyond the purely systematic elements or langue and begin considering the aspects of execution or parole.

Wiener, for the most part, fails to account for any conditions or consequences of actual execution in his theory of information. Hayles addresses this by noting, “Confronted with two situations, he [Wiener] was much more inclined to move easily and quickly to an abstract level, where similarities in patterns became evident, than to remain attentive to the particularities that made each situation unique” (Hayles, pg. 99).

Furthermore, I believe that Wiener is hinting at such a discrepancy when he states, “The great weakness of the machine…is that it cannot yet take into account the vast range of probability that characterizes the human situation” (Wiener quoted in Hayles, pg. 105). The question then arises as to how a theory of information can account for variability in execution as a gun can misfire; a speaker can stutter; a musician can improvise. As with other forays into automated systems and artificial intelligence, it still remains to be seen whether a theory of information can ever truly straddle the boundary of human and machine.

[edit] References

Danesi, Marcel and Paul Perron (1999). Analysing Cultures. University of Indiana Press: Bloomington, IN.

Gadet, Francoise (1989). Saussure and Contemporary Culture (Trans. Gregory Elliott). Hutchinson Radius: London.

Hayles, N. Katherine (1999). How We Became Posthuman. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL.

Saussure, Ferdinand de (1959). “The Linguistic Sign” from Classic Readings in Semiotics. Eds. Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Legas: Toronto, ON (2003).