Alexander, D. (2014). Communicating earthquake risk to the public: The trial of the “L’Aquila seven”.

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Alexander, D. (2014). Communicating earthquake risk to the public: The trial of the “L’Aquila seven”. Natural Hazards, 72(2), 1159-1173. [1]

Ashley Williams

Alexander’s paper can be situated in the realm of communication and emergency management. He uses the real life example of the L’Aquila earthquake that took place in central Italy on April 6th, 2009 and the trial and conviction of seven public officials from L’Aquila that followed for having allegedly given out misleading and incorrect information to the public about the earthquake. This paper outlines the importance of accurate information being given during emergency situations and the consequences that can occur from doing otherwise.

Alexander’s aim for the paper is “to construct a narrative of the trial and consider its significance in a context of science, politics, earthquake reconstruction and local and national affairs” and “to seek to shed light on the motivations of the protagonist” (2014, p.1160). Before getting into the contents of the paper he disclaims that “it is emphatically not [his] intention to try to ‘hold a second trial’, nor to attempt to judge whether the outcome was right or wrong” (2014, p.1160). The paper is organised into eight sub-headings including an introduction, how the case developed: before the L’Aquila earthquake, how the case developed: after the L’Aquila earthquake, reactions to the trial and sentence, context of the trial and pertinent questions, what is next, further consideration, and a conclusion.

The paper gives an interesting perspective on real life examples of when communication in emergency management failed the public. Alexander uses an effective example of an earlier earthquake in Italy to describe the devastation that can occur from failed or misleading communication. “In Paganica, a satellite town of L’Aquila city, people came out of their homes until functionaries of the civil protection service came around and told them to ‘‘calm down and go home because everything is under control’’. I investigated a case of this kind in L’Aquila city, in which the foreshock after midnight had caused a family of three to go outside. The daughter slept in the family car and survived: her parents took the advice of the civil protection and went back to bed. Their apartment was in the centre of a multi-storey building that suffered midfloor failure. Firemen extracted their bodies from a space only 15 cm wide between the two collapsed floors” (2014, p.1162). The dates and statistics help to strengthen the paper. For example, Alexander states “on 22 October 2012, the charge of manslaughter was upheld and the seven defendants were condemned to 6 years in prison” (2014, p.1164). The reader is not left wondering what the outcome was and is made fully aware of the outcome of the trial. Alexander suggests that the media was not accurate in portraying why the scientist were taken to court and due to this the public opinion on the case was skewed. He states, “there is a natural tendency to interpret news and information in the light of one’s own experience and concern” (2104, p.1165) which is an important concept in communication. In regards to the media “studies of journalism and disaster show that it is often convenient for the mass media to over simplify complex arguments” (2014, p.1168) which is a good point that also applies to agenda setting theory. Overall the main point of this paper and the reason why the L’Aquila case is now an example of failed communication during an emergency is because of the “absence of information must be distinguished from the wrong information” (2014, p.1168).

Although the background shared on the author about his time spent living in Italy does give context as to why he was motivated to write a paper on the L’Aquila earthquake and trial, it weakens the paper because it is unnecessary information in regards to the communication used by the scientist to warn the public about the earthquake. Alexander also mentions his connection to the “L’Aquila seven” having worked with some of them on jobs in the past. By stating this he is suggesting to the reader that he has a bias on the topic. Although the L’Aquila trial and conviction certainly would have made scientists in the field of emergency management think carefully about the repercussions that could occur from failing to do a sufficient job of warning the public in an emergency, Alexander states, “scientists will never be able to conduct their work without fear of political interference” (2014, p.1160) which comes across as an exaggeration. In attempt to balance the clear bias that Alexander has in writing this paper he states “the positive side of the L’Aquila case is that the earthquake was an occasion for a massive outpouring of nation solidarity” (2014, p.1168). This point was unnecessary to make and weakens the paper. There is no positive side to a devastating earthquake that killed 308 people, of which 26 died because of miscommunication, seriously injured 1,500, 202, damaged about 100,000 buildings and left 67,000 people homeless (2014, p.1159-1160). He also uses the phrase ‘in other words’ multiple times throughout the paper instead of getting to the point right away.

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